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MORALITY ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE
CRIMINAL LAW AND THE MODERN
DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
THOMAS L. HINDES t
American society has available a wide array of tools to influence
the conduct of its members, ranging from education and persuasion
to deadly force. Yet it has been all too willing to employ that de-
vice at the latter end of this spectrum-the criminal sanction-to
enforce moral values resting, at best, on the periphery of legitimate
societal concern. The criminal codes of our state and federal
governments contain numerous prohibitions of acts that do not
seem to involve harmful consequences to others besides the actor.
In some instances, conduct is prohibited even though morality ap-
pears to be the only value protected by the prohibition. Although
forceful repression of deviant behavior has been common to all
political systems, American society does not sanction the use of the
criminal law to repress all conduct inconsistent with majoritarian
moral values.
Elementary constitutional law dictates that we have a limited
government. Certain areas of purely individual concern, guar-
anteed by the Constitution are protected from governmental in-
trusion without some "compelling" reason justifying the intrusion.1
This Article considers the extent to which government may use
the criminal sanction to coerce competent adults consistently with
individual liberty. It examines some of the common criminal pro-
scriptions that have been found to be or arguably should be re-
garded as beyond the power of government to enforce, and notes
the limitations upon governmental power currently recognized by
the nation's judiciary and the traditional jurisprudential questions
raised by the enforcement of morality. Finally, it advocates an
approach to constitutional interpretation that will permit the
government to carry out its legitimate function without unneces-
sarily abridging personal liberty.
f Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University. J.D. 1968, University
of Kentucky. This Article was partially completed with support from the West
Virginia University Foundation. I would like to thank my colleagues James A.
McLaughlin and Frederick F. Schauer for their many thoughtful comments and
suggestions, and a succession of research assistants who have afded immeasurably in
the preparation of this Article: Michael Parham, Terrence Gurley and Sam Byrer.
1 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). For a further discussion




Consider, for example, the prohibition of marijuana use in
American society. The criminal laws in every state proscribe the
sale of the drug or its possession in large quantities, and in most
states possession of any quantity, no matter how small, is a criminal
violation.2 Such a proscription is surprising in light of the lack of
reliable evidence of marijuana's harmful effects. In fact, over
eighty years ago, the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission concluded
that:
In all but the most exceptional cases, the injury from
habitual moderate use [of hemp drugs] is not appreciable.
The excessive use may certainly be accepted as very in-
jurious, though it must be admitted that in many exces-
sive consumers the injury is not clearly marked. The
injury done by the excessive use is, however, confined
almost exclusively to the consumer himself; the effect on
society is rarely appreciable. It has been the most striking
feature in this inquiry to find how little the effects of hemp
drugs have obtruded themselves on observation. The large
number of witnesses of all classes who professed never to
2 The general model for most state penal systems regulating marijuana and other
"controlled substances" has become the UNIFoRm CONThOLLED SUBSTANCES Acr.
As of the end of 1976, 43 states had adopted this Act, at least in part. 9 UNIwormr
LAws ANN. 39 (Supp. 1974-76). The essential reform accomplished by this Act,
at least as pertains to marijuana, was a general reduction of penalties and a provision
permitting judges to place first offenders on probation without adjudicating their
guilt. U oRm Coymourg_ SuBsTAcEs AcT § 407. Under this provision, success-
ful completion of the probationary period results in discharge of the proceedings.
At this time, eight states have passed statutes that either decriminalize the
possession of small amounts of marijuana or make it a petty offense. In Alaska, for
example, possession for private use of any amount of marijuana in a private place or
one ounce in public by a person who is 18 years of age or older is a civil offense
carrying a maximum fine of $100. ALcsxA STAT. § 17.12.110 (1975). See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 11357 (West Supp. 1976) (possession of one ounce or
less is misdemeanor, carrying no permanent criminal record and a maximum fine of
$100); CoLo. RFv. STAT. § 12-22-412 (1973 & Supp. 1976) (possession of one
ounce or less is "class 2 petty offense," involving no permanent criminal record and
maximum fine of $100); Mnr. STAT. ANN. § 152.15 (West Supp. 1977) (possession
or distribution without remuneration of one and one-half ounces or less is civil offense
with maximum fine of $100 for first offense); Oino REv. CODE A.qN. § 2925.11
(Page Supp. 1977) (possession of less than 100 grams is a minor misdemeanor,
imposing no criminal record and maximum fine of $100); ORE. Itv. STAT. § 167.207
(1975) (possession of less than one ounce is civil violation with maximum fine of
$100). See also 1977 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 189, § 92 (possession of one ounce or
less is class 2 misdemeanor, punishable by 30 days imprisonment or $100 fine or
both) (repealing 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 158, §§ 42-46 [possession of one ounce
or less is petty offense equivalent to traffic ticket with fine set by state supreme
court]). Compare ME. BEv. STAT. tit. 22 § 2383 (Supp. 1975) (possession of
marijuana for personal use is civil violation with maximum fine of $200) with ME.
REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1106(3) (1976) (possession of more than one and one-half
ounces raises presumption of intent to distribute).
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have seen these effects, the vague statements made by many
who professed to have observed them, the very few wit-
nesses who could so recall a case as to give any definite
account of it, and the manner in which a large proportion
of these cases broke down on the first attempt to examine
them, are facts which combine to show most clearly how
little injury society has hitherto sustained from hemp
drugs. 3
These general conclusions as to the effects of marijuana use on
the user and society have been repeatedly verified in numerous
other inquiries.4  Indeed, even the most critical reports on the
3 MARiUjuANA: REPoRT OF TBE INDiAN HEmP DRUGS COMmissioN 1893-1894,
ch. 13, if 552 (J. Kaplan ed. 1969).
4 There have been several governmental studies of drug use, including marijuana
or exclusively marijuana, between the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report in
1894 and the first report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse
in 1972. A description of all these reports, except that of the National Commission,
may be found in E. BncBa, Licrr AND ILucrr DRUGs 451-53 (1972). Because
numerous books have been devoted in whole or in part to discussing marijuana, it
would be presumptuous to suppose that the physical and emotional effects of mari-
juana use could be effectively summarized in this footnote. J. KAPLAN, MaRjuANA-
Tim NEw PhosmrrimN 83-85 (1969), includes the following summary of the
"'ordinary' effects of marijuana":
The most significant thing about the effects of marijuana is that the
objective effects of the drug as measured in the laboratory are far less gross
than the subjective effects. The objective physical effects are an increased
heartbeat, a reddening of the conjunctiva, and, if it can be considered an
objective effect, a dryness in the throat.
The objective mental effects of the drug, similarly, are far less gross
than one might expect. Indeed, it is as yet impossible in the laboratory to
devise any mental test that will consistently reveal anyone to be under the
influence of marijuana. It does appear, however, that marijuana does
adversely affect immediate memory and that while this has little effect on
the performance of simple tasks, it does cause a noticeable decrease of the
ability to perform complex tasks that require sustained levels of concen-
tration and memory.
The most important and widespread ordinary effects of marijuana are
a feeling of relaxation, a sense of euphoria, and an impression that one's
senses have somehow been sharpened.
The mechanism of marijuana's effect is by no means clearly understood.
One recent hypothesis-the first that seems to explain all the varied effects
of the drug-is that marijuana's basic action is on the time sense. This
causes a time distortion that to a greater extent than usual fixes the user
upon the present moment rather than upon the past or the future. As a
result he is temporarily freed from worries about the future or regrets about
the past and hence is relaxed and mildly euphoric. Since he forgets bore-
dom with past sensations, the user's present sensations seem newer and
hence sharper and more intense. This applies to colors, taste, hearing, and
the enjoyment of music and sex.
In addition, the fixation on the present tends to blur the usual cate-
gories by which we are accustomed to interpreting events and feelings. As
a result the user will acquire-though to an extent far more limited than
drug partisans. (especially of LSD) may suggest-new ways of looking at
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harmfulness of marijuana use leave marijuana in a category con-
siderably more benign than such commonly used, and legally obtain-
able, items as cigarettes and alcohol.5
In view of the largely nonexistent scientific case against mari-
juana, the legal proscription against its sale and possession is
questionable. Of course, the passage of a statute, such as one making
marijuana possession criminal, does not require an objectively
demonstrable case against the drug; a majority of legislative votes
will suffice. Once a statute is passed and enforced by the police 6
only the courts remain to pass judgment on its validity.
The constitutional challenges to marijuana statutes have pri-
marily been of three types: (1) because marijuana is largely harm-
less, criminal sanctions against its use are arbitrary and, as such,
violative of due process of law; (2) because other, more harmful
drugs are freely available, prosecution of marijuana possessors is
arbitrary and, as such, violative of equal protection guarantees; and
(3) because marijuana is largely harmless, the imposition of criminal
events. Finally, the fixation on the present is not only a source of joy to the
user. It can be extremely frightening-or, even if not so interpreted, can be
quite unpleasant. This ordinary effect of marijuana is underrepresented in
the sample of regular users. The reason is simply that those who tend to
be frightened more often by the less rooted feeling of marijuana use are
less likely to continue using the drug.
Historically the justifications for criminalizing marijuana have ranged from asser-
tions that marijuana led to violent crime and to heroin addiction through more recent
notions that marijuana caused brain damage, genetic defects, and sapped users of
motivation to be productive members of society. All of these contentions have been
considered and rejected in the studies referred to above. The National Commission
on Marijuana and Drug Abuse found that marijuana was not a major threat to public
health or a danger to public safety and did not lead to physical dependence or
addiction to "hard" drugs. Specifically rejected were claims that the drug caused
brain damage or genetic defects. NATIONAL CommissIoN ONe MAImuANA AND t DRUG
ABusE, FrRST REPORT: MAnmu A: A SIGNAL OF MISNERrSTANDING 84-85 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Frst REPoRT]. In language reminiscent of that of the Indian
Hemp Drugs Commission, text accompanying note 3 supra, the Commission noted
that "[t]he most notable statement that can be made about the vast majority of
marihuana users-experimenters and intermittent users-is that they are essentially
indistinguishable from their non-marihuana using peers by any fundamental criterion
other than their marihuana use." Id. 41.
"There is no question that alcohol and tobacco are causing us far more health
problems than marijuana does." The Washington Post, February 13, 1976, § A, at 7,
col. 1 (quoting Dr. Robert L. Dupont, head of the National Institute on Drug
Abuse). There is no evidence that anyone has ever died from an overdose of
marijuana or from using the drug over a period of time, Fmhisr REPORT, supra note 4,
at 56-57, a claim the cigarette and alcohol industries would be unable to substantiate
for their products.
0 In 1974 alone there were 445,600 arrests. FFrDmn BUREAU OF INVEsTIGATION,
UNwoa CIm REPoRTs 179 (1974). Of course these figures do not reveal how
many different individuals were arrested, how many of the arrests were merely for
possession of marijuana, or how many arrests resulted in convictions. At minimum,
however, the number of arrests alone reveals the tremendous burden the marijuana
laws place on our criminal justice system.
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penalties for its possession amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment.
All of these arguments are ultimately premised, at least in part,
on the assumption that marijuana is virtually harmless, and courts
have usually pointed to the presence of some contrary scientific evi-
dence and the presumption of validity 7 attaching to legislative acts
as ample reasons to reject this assumption.8
Although several decisions have, because of a split court,
amounted to something less than an unqualified endorsement of
marijuana statutes,9 only one decision has invalidated such a statute
solely on constitutional grounds. In Ravin v. State,10 the Alaska
marijuana statute was found unconstitutional in part. Ravin was
7 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (party
challenging state or federal statute has burden of rebutting presumptive constitu-
tionality).
8 United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 402 U.S. 939 (1971); Scott v. United States, 395 F.2d 619 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400
P.2d 923 (1965); United States v. Thorne, 325 A.2d 764 (D.C. 1974); Borras v.
State, 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 808 (1970); Raines v.
State, 225 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969); State v. Kantuer, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Commonwealth v. Leis, 335 Mass. 189, 243
N.E.2d 898 (1969); Commonwealth v. Macek, 218 Pa. Super. 124, 279 A.2d 772
(1971).
9 In People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972), six participating
judges of the Michigan Supreme Court found four different reasons to reverse the
conviction of John A. Sinclair. Sinclair, a campus political radical of some regional
notoriety, had received a sentence of nine and one-half to ten years in prison for
possession of marijuana; the evidence showed that he gave two marijuana cigarettes
to undercover policemen. Three judges agreed that classifying marijuana as a
"narcotic" was unreasonable and as such, it violated equal protection of the law.
Accord, People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971). Three judges
thought that the sentence Sinclair received amounted to "cruel and unusual punish-
ment," and two judges thought that the cigarettes were the fruits of an illegal
entrapment and should have been excluded from evidence. Although he concurred
in the last two reasons for reversal, Justice Kavanaugh also wrote that the marijuana
statute amounted to "an impermissible intrusion on the fundamental rights to liberty
and the pursuit of happiness, and is an unwarranted interference with the right to
possess and use private property." 387 Mich. at 133, 194 N.W.2d at 896.
In State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948
(1972), two judges voted to affirm the defendant's conviction for possession of
marijuana, rejecting an argument that classifying marijuana as a "narcotic" was
unconstitutional. This argument was also rejected by a concurring judge who never-
theless went on to say that, were the issue properly before the court, he was not
convinced that the state could meet its burden to "prove that the use of marijuana
is not only harmful to the user but also to the general public before it can prohibit
its use." Id. at 338, 493 P.2d at 313 (Abe, J., concurring). One dissenting judge
believed that the regulation of marijuana possession violated fundamental personal
rights of privacy and would have reversed the conviction for that reason. The other
dissenter believed the classification of marijuana as a narcotic was unconstitutional.
But cf. State v. Lee, 51 Haw. 516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970) (regulation of motorcycle
helmets is within the police power as a matter of public interest although no clear
link was shown between lack of a helmet and injury to others).
10 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
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arrested for possession of marijuana under circumstances that did
not appear in the opinion," and he appealed from the denial of his
motion to dismiss the indictment. He raised constitutional argu-
ments based upon the denial of his right of privacy guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment and the Alaska Constitution' 2 as well as
of equal protection. The Alaska Supreme Court discussed the two
tier due process test applied in United States Supreme Court de-
cisions and in other Alaska decisions: If the right infringed by
governmental action is considered fundamental, the state must
demonstrate a compelling reason for the infringement; if the right
infringed is not fundamental, then only a reasonable relationship
to some legitimate governmental purpose need be shown.13 Ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with this dual standard, the court decided
that Ravin's privacy claim should be resolved
by determining whether there is a proper governmental
interest in imposing restrictions on marijuana use and
whether the means chosen bear a substantial relationship
to the legislative purpose. If governmental restrictions
interfere with the individual's right to privacy, we will
require that the relationship between means and ends be
not merely reasonable but close and substantial.14
Despite its apparent rejection of the fundamental right-com-
pelling interest analysis, the court went on to decide that the right
to smoke marijuana is not fundamental. 15 Nevertheless, the court
"1 According to an article on the decision published in Rolling Stone, Ravin
was arrested for a muffler violation while driving his car. A search of the car
revealed some marijuana and Ravin was arrested for possession. Treisman, Tokin'
on the Tundra: Goldrush to Decriminalize Marajuana in Alaska, RorxwG STo,,
July 31, 1975, at 27.
12 "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infinged.
The legislature shall implement this section." ALAs. CONSr. art. I, § 22.
IS 537 P.2d at 497-98.
14 Id. 498.
15 Id. 502. This may perhaps be contrasted with a previous ruling of the Alaska
Supreme Court to the effect that hair length choices were fundamental rights.
Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972). Although Breese itself merely held
that hair length was a fundamental right and that a school attempting to expel a
student for violating a grooming regulation ("Male students' 'hair must not be down
over the ears, over the eyes, . . . [or] over the collar.'" Id. 161) must show a
compelling interest justifying the regulation, id. 168-72, the decision was character-
ized in Ravin as one in which "the student's traditional liberty pertaining to auton-
omy in personal appearance was threatened in such a way that his constitutionally
guaranteed right to an education was jeopardized." 537 P.2d at 502. If the court
is really suggesting that the ultimate effect of the infringement is a relevant factor in
determining whether the particular right at issue is "fundamental," this would be a
novel approach to classifying rights. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1973) (importance of service provided by state does
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read the privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution 16 and the
United States Supreme Court decisions Griswold v. Connecticut 17
and Stanley v. Georgia 18 to create a fundamental right of "privacy
in the home." This privacy right is subject to two limitations:
First, we agree with the Supreme Court of the United
States, which has strictly limited the Stanley guarantee to
possession for purely private, noncommercial use in the
home. And secondly, we think this right must yield when
it interferes in a serious manner with the health, safety,
rights and privileges of others or with the public welfare.
No one has an absolute right to do things in the privacy
of his own home which will affect himself or others ad-
versely. Indeed, one aspect of a private matter is that it is
private, that is, that it does not adversely affect persons
beyond the actor, and hence is none of their business.
When a matter does affect the public, directly or indirectly,
it loses its wholly private character, and can be made to
yield when an appropriate public need is demonstrated.19
Although there may be no fundamental right to smoke marijuana,
the court concluded that the "basic right" 20 to privacy in the home
prohibits criminal sanctions for possession of marijuana "unless the
state can meet its substantial burden and show that proscription
. . . is supportable by achievement of a legitimate state interest." 21
The court then reviewed the evidence presented to the trial
court concerning the medical and social aspects of marijuana use,
concluding that, except for the effects of marijuana on driving
ability, "there is no firm evidence that marijuana, as presently used
in this country, is generally a danger to the user or to others." 22
Accordingly, the court held that no legitimate governmental interest
in prohibiting marijuana use justified infringing the right of privacy
in the home. The interest of the state in promoting traffic safety
and the existing doubts as to the safety of the drug justified the
not determine fundamentality); id. 112-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (special sig-
nificance attaches to education because of its effect on ability to exercise first
amendment rights).
16 Note 12 supra.
17381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18394 U.S. 557 (1969).
19 537 P.2d at 504. It becomes clear only later in the opinion that the court
classifies actions harmful only to the actor as a matter of private concern. Id. 509.
20 Id. 504.
21Id.
22 Id. 508. See J. KAPL _, MARIJUANA-THE NEw Poammo 276-86 (1970)
(discussing marijuana intoxication and driving ability).
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general prohibition against marijuana cultivation, sale, or possession,
but mere possession in the home may not be punished under the
statute.
As a result of this decision, 23 an adult may use and possess mari-
juana in his Alaska home, so long as the quantity possessed does not
indicate an intent to sell. He may not, however, buy or sell the
drug or use or possess it in a public place. In a subsequent case,
the court affirmed the possession conviction of an individual who
was involved in the sale of two pounds of marijuana.24 The court
observed that Ravin was inapplicable when the possession was in a
public place and incident to sale.
Even though the Ravin court was less than clear in delineating
the precise constitutional standards by which it judged Alaska's
marijuana laws, and its ultimate distinctions between possession in
the home and in "public" and between possession and buying and
selling are logically not quite consistent,25 the result is a laudable
first step in the process of rationalizing our drug laws. Yet the
prospect of other courts, particularly the United States Supreme
Court, emulating the Ravin approach is remote. First, the Alaska
court was construing the reach of an explicit recognition of individ-
ual privacy, recently added to the state constitution, to which courts
in other jurisdictions may not have recourse.26 Second, the court
relies on Stanley v. Georgia 27 for a constitutional principle of pri-
vacy that goes well beyond the limiting language expressed in
Stanley itself and the subsequent limitations on the principle de-
livered in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.
28
Stanley has often been relied on by litigants urging the in-
validity of marijuana and other drug laws and is almost as widely
relied on by courts in rejecting such challenges. 29 The appellant in
Stanley was convicted of possessing obscene films, discovered in his
bedroom drawer by police searching for evidence of bookmaking
activities pursuant to a search warrant. Distinguishing Roth v.
United States 30 and other obscenity cases that involved some form
23 Shortly after this decision, Alaska substantially changed its marijuana laws.
See note 2 supra.
24 Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206 (Alaska 1975).
25 See text accompanying note 159 infra.
26 537 P.2d at 500-03. See note 12 supra.
27394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28413 U.S. 49 (1973).
29 E.g., United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 402 U.S. 939 (1971); Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244
(Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
30354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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of commercial exploitation of obscenity, the Court held that the
government may not lawfully prosecute the mere possession of ob-
scene materials in the privacy of one's own home. "If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch." 31
Although the Court made some general references to a right of
privacy, quoting part of Mr. Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,32 the opinion is unmistakably directed
at protecting first amendment values. This caveat is most clearly
set forth in the final footnote to the opinion, which Ravin did not
address:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power
of the State or Federal Government to make possession of
other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a
crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the
Georgia statute's infringement of fundamental liberties
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No
First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes
making mere possession criminal.33
Any doubts concerning the breadth of Stanley's applicability
were effectively resolved in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.34 Paris
Adult Theatre I involved a civil action to enjoin the screening of
two allegedly obscene films at Paris Adult Theatres I and II, estab-
lishments that gave notice at their joint entrance that "mature" films
were shown within and apparently admitted only adults. Although
the Georgia trial court denied the injunctive relief because of the
Theatres' adults-only policy, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed
the decision 35 and, on appeal, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the granting of injunctive relief.
31 394 U.S. at 565.
32277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man.
33 394 U.S. at 568 n.11.
34413 U.S. 49 (1973).
35 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (1971).
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Paris Adult Theatre I is remarkable not so much for its limita-
tion of Stanley to its facts, 36 because other decisions had probably al-
ready accomplished that end,3 7 but rather for Chief Justice Burger's
seeming endorsement of an exhaustive list of "legitimate state in-
terests" involved in obscenity regulation. If obscenity is not pro-
tected speech under the first amendment and the privacy rights of
Stanley are restricted to the home, the Chief Justice's extended
canvas of societal values vindicated by obscenity regulation seems
unnecessary.38 Necessary or not, the majority's discussion indicates
just how far the present Court is likely to permit state and federal
governments to regulate consensual adult activities that might be
viewed as immoral by majoritarian values.
The Court rejected out of hand any suggestion that consenting
adults may view obscene films in a theatre or other place open to
the public as an exercise of the privacy right announced in Stanley,
stating: "The idea of a 'privacy' right and a place of public accom-
modation are, in this context, mutually exclusive." 39 By its own
admission, the majority was unable to distinguish between the state's
interest in prohibiting a man and woman from performing an act of
sexual intercourse "at high noon in Times Square" 40 from its in-
terest in prohibiting the same conduct depicted on stage or screen
before a group of adults who knowingly entered a theatre to see
36 413 U.S. at 65-68.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363
(1971); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). These cases involved com-
mercial distributors of pornography who attempted to use the Stanley rationale by
arguing that the material was purchased by adults for use in the home. This appli-
cation of Stanley, which would go far toward overruling Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), was rejected. The Reidel Court observed that "[t]he personal
constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess and read obscenity in their
homes and their freedom of mind and thought do not depend on whether . . .
obscenity is constitutionally protected. Their rights to have and view that material
in private are independently saved by the Constitution." 402 U.S. at 356. As in
Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court distinguished the commercial exploitation of por-
nography from the private use of pornography. Because Stanley was expressly
premised on the first amendment, this distinction is not quite as apparent as the
Court suggests.
38 Even though obscenity is not considered as protected speech under the first
amendment, the state must still show that the proscription in the statute was
rationally related to some legitimate legislative purpose. See Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Given the rather automatic fashion in which
this approach is used to sustain legislation, the Court could have disposed of the
question without a great deal of discussion. For a contrary suggestion on this point,
see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
391 (1963).
39 413 U.S. at 66-67.
40 Id. 67.
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such a depiction.41 What, one might ask, are the interests of govern-
ment in prosecuting 2 individuals who engage in either of these
types of conduct? The Court's answer was to say that "these include
the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total com-
munity environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers,
and, possibly, the public safety itself." 43  Although the opinion
stops short of accepting as fact the "arguable correlation between
obscene material and crime," 44 it finds a direct correlation between
the proliferation of obscenity and our ability to maintain a "decent
society." The concern expressed is for the "tone of society . . .
the style of and quality of life, now and in the future." 45
The Court's lumping together of these two rather distinct
classes of state interests-the prevention of crime said to be provoked
by consumption of obscenity, and the cultivation of a decent society
"[q]uite apart from sex crimes" 4-is most disturbing. The legis-
lature is not required to show with statistical certainty that its con-
clusions are correct,47 and perhaps it is empirically arguable, even if
the minority view, that obscenity causes crime.48  But to say that
the legislature in like manner may conclude that obscenity subverts
the decency of society is to mask a judgment of a very different
order behind a pretense of potential verifiability. To put a theater
41 The actual analogy used by the Court was the comparison between depicting
or performing sexual acts on a theater stage and performing a sex act in public
while discussing politics. Although political discussion during public sexual inter-
course would dearly not furnish a constitutional defense in a prosecution for indecent
exposure any more than reciting from the Bible while committing an axe murder
would furnish a first amendment defense, the Court's utilization of this principle is
inapposite to the context of obscenity regulation. The governmental interest in
protecting the general public from obtrusive displays of lewd behavior should be
considerably broader than the interest in regulating the movies or stage shows that
are available to informed, consenting adults.
4 2 Although Paris Adult Theatre I was a civil case, neither the opinion itself nor
other Supreme Court rulings on obscenity suggest that the holding would not be
applicable to criminal prosecutions. As the Court noted, although the instant equity
action "is civil in nature, and does not directly involve the state criminal statute
proscribing exhibition of obscene material, the Georgia case law permitting civil
injunction does adopt the definition of 'obscene materials' used by the criminal
statute." 413 U.S. at 54 (footnotes omitted).
43 413 U.S. at 58.
44 Id. (footnote omitted).
45Id. 59 (quoting Bickel, Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 22 PuB.
INTEREsT 25, 25-26 (1971)).
46 413 U.S. at 58-59.
47Id. 61 (citing cases).
4 8 E.g., REPORT OF THE ComNssioN ox OBscNIY AND POBMOGRAPHy 390-412
(1970) (minority report), cited 413 U.S. at 58 n.8.
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owner, and perhaps his patrons as well 49, in prison because the films
he has shown might harm the "tone" of society asserts an incredible
arrogation of power over the lives of individuals.
The willingness of the present Supreme Court majority to em-
brace enthusiastically the governmental interests in regulating and
proscribing obscenity suggests that it would summarily approve
criminal statutes protecting the "decency" of society against activities
that less clearly implicate the immunity of the first amendment.
Such is not entirely the case, however. In now well-known cases the
Court has found in the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment,
and, perhaps, the ninth amendment as well, limitations on govern-
mental power to regulate the use and dispensing of contraceptives 50
and the securing of an abortion. 5'
The first in this line of cases, Griswold v. Connecticut 52 is
significant largely because it illustrates a variety of approaches to
interpreting the general due process language of the fourteenth
amendment. The illustrative value of the case is occasioned by the
six different opinions required for the nine justices to express their
approval or disapproval of Connecticut's anticontraception statute.
Connecticut made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense,58 and
aiding and abetting others to violate this statute was similarly pro-
scribed.54 The Griswold defendants, appellants before the Supreme
Court after the state court proceedings, were convicted of giving
information, instruction, and medical advice about contraceptives
to married persons.
Justice Douglas, joined by only Justice Clark, authored the
opinion of the Court. In striking down the statute, Douglas in-
voked the incorporation doctrine.55 Referring to the right of asso-
49 Although Stanley is the only case in which the Supreme Court has dealt with
the prosecution of a consumer of pornographic material, the limitations imposed on
the scope of that decision diminish its applicability to the arrest of an individual for
wvatching a dirty movie in a "public" theater or for the public possession of obscene
materials. Given the facility with which the Court can distinguish private use from
commercial dissemination of obscene materials, they would presumably be capable
of distinguishing private from public possession of such material. See F. SCHtum,
THE LAW OF OBSCENMI 175-76 (1976).
5OEisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
51 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53 CoNr. GEN. STAT. Arix. §§ 53-32 (1960) (repealed 1969).
54 Id. §§5 4-196 (repealed 1969).
55 The incorporation theory was given its broadest sweep in opinions authored
by Justices Black and Douglas. Justice Black's dissent, joined by Justice Douglas,
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ciation guaranteed by the first amendment, the rights of security in
one's home guaranteed by the third and fourth amendments, the
personal privacy fostered by the privilege against self-incrimination,
and numerous cases discussing these rights, Douglas found that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance." 56 These rights and their penumbras create a right of
privacy in the marital relation and are incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment, thus protecting them against unnecessarily broad
state regulation. Having cited a group of cases and constitutional
provisions, most of which were facially unrelated to the issue at
hand, Douglas concluded:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any in-
volved in our prior decisions.
57
in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), best illustrates the approach these
Justices would take. Black argued:
the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment [was] to extend to all
the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. To
hold that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of
Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great
design of a written Constitution.
Id. 89. Also dissenting in that case, Justices Murphy and Rutledge agreed that the
entire Bill of Rights was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, but that the
specific provisions of the first eight amendments should not operate to limit the scope
of the fourteenth. Id. 124. Justice Black, ever the literal interpreter, was unable to
take this additional step; witness his dissent in Griswold.
Perhaps the most forceful rebuttal of the mechanical approach that Justice Black
advocated is found in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Adamson:
The short answer to the suggestion that the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which ordains "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," was a way of saying that
every State must thereafter initiate prosecutions through indictment by a
grand jury, must have a trial by a jury of twelve in criminal cases, and
must have trial by such a jury in common law suits where the amount in
controversy exceeds twenty dollars, is that it is a strange way of saying it.
It would be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey such specific
commands in such a roundabout and inexplicit way.
Id. 63. See Henkin, "Selective Incorporatior" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication
-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YA=E L.J. 319 (1957).




The Douglas opinion illustrates what many regard as a short-
coming of the incorporation approach to the fourteenth amendment.
Even Justice Black, another adherent of this approach, commented
in his dissenting opinion: "I like my privacy as well as the next one,
but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a
right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
provision." 58 Although Justice Stewart regarded the Connecticut
law as "uncommonly silly," 59 he, like Black, was unable to find any
specific constitutional language to justify the majority's ruling.
Placed against these dissenting views, Douglas' creativity in finding
penumbras emanating from largely unrelated specific guarantees,
unfolds as an attempt to adhere to incorporation where there was
little to incorporate.
The concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg attracted the most
support, gaining the support of Justices Warren and Brennan.
Goldberg began by discounting the validity of the incorporation
theory, asserting that "the concept of liberty protects those personal
rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific
terms of the Bill of Rights." 00 He then proceeded to outline a
right, styled the "right of marital privacy," drawing considerable
inferential support from the ninth amendment.
61
The opinion delved to some extent into the history of the ninth
amendment in order to assert that it was intended to guarantee
against a limited interpretation of individual liberty: "It was
proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enu-
merated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential
rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be
interpreted as a denial that others were protected." 62
Although Justice Goldberg stopped short of declaring that the
ninth amendment, unlike the first eight, applied directly to the
states or that it was "incorporated" into the fourteenth, he con-
cluded: "In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support
to the view that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or the




61 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX. See
B. PATrEaSON, THE FORGOTTEN NnTm AMENDMENT (1955).
62 381 U.S. at 488-89.
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eight amendments." 63 He then asserted that an essential part of
this liberty was the right of privacy in the marital relation and the
marital home.
Even though Justice Goldberg did not purport to find this
right explicitly in the Bill of Rights, the liberty he extracted is
fairly specific. It is a right of marital privacy that will not permit
forced interference with the home and family either to limit birth
control or to promote it, at least in the absence of some "compel-
ling" reason not present in Connecticut's anticontraception statute6 4
The liberty recognized however, appears to extend only to the
lawfully married. State regulation of promiscuous or deviant sexual
conduct is not invalidated by Goldberg's notion of individual
liberty.6 5
The opinions of Justices Harlan 66 and White,6 7 concurring in
the result, also disagree with Douglas' theory of incorporation.
They both utilize a natural law interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment, concluding that Connecticut's statute violated "basic
values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "68 Justice
631d. 493.
64 Under the fundamental right-compelling interest approach, see text accom-
panying notes 149-52 infra, the government must demonstrate extremely important
reasons to pass a statute that tends to inhibit the exercise of a fundamental right
such as the right of marital privacy. As might be supposed, Connecticut was wholly
unable to supply any such compelling reason (or any rational basis for that matter)
to support the anticontraception statute. Perhaps realizing that to argue that the
statute reflected religious views about the morality of contraception would be tanta-
mount to confessing error, the state suggested that the statute promoted its interest
in preventing premarital and extramarital sexual relationships. Even if the state has
a legitimate interest in the prevention of illicit sex, banning contraceptive use by all
individuals, married and single, is a rather absurd way of promoting such interests.
The concurring opinions of Justice Goldberg, 381 U.S. at 486, 497-99, and Justice
White, id. 502, 505-07, discuss this purported rationale and reject it.
65 Because Justice Goldberg bases his ultimate conclusion about the validity of
the Connecticut statute on the "right of marital privacy," he finds no difficulty in
the state's regulation of illicit sex, quoting with approval from Justice Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961):
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State
forbids.., but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential
and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the
State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered
and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to
forbid extra-marital sexuality ... or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent
in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of
that intimacy.
381 U.S. at 499.
66 381 U.S. at 499.
671d. 502.
68 Id. 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). The "ordered liberty" approach is the
general natural law standard for interpreting the fourteenth amendment taken from
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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White found "the broad ban [to be] of marginal utility to the de-
clared objective" and violative of due process.69
The privacy right recognized in Griswold is today generally
thought to encompass only the marital relationship and to be re-
stricted to those aspects of the marital relationship that involve the
marital home or some other "private" place.70 The reliance of
Eisenstadt v. Baird 71 on the equal protection clause in striking down
a Connecticut statute that banned dispensing contraceptives or ad-
vocating their use to single people confirms the narrow scope of the
due process right articulated in Griswold.72
The next judicial consideration of "governmental intrusion
into . . . the decision whether to bear or beget a child," 7 con-
cerned the validity of abortion laws. In the cases of Roe v. Wade"7
and Doe v. Bolton, 5 the Court held that individual liberty under
the fourteenth amendment included a "right of privacy . . .broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
69 381 U.S. at 507.
70 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
71405 U.S. 438 (1972).
72 The purported justifications for the statute at issue in Eisenstadt were: (a) to
protect health by regulating the distribution of dangerous drugs; (b) to protect
morals by regulating the sexual lives of single people; and/or (c) to promote marital
fidelity. The Court observed that protecting morals could not reasonably be regarded
as a legislative purpose, stating:
It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has pre-
scribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for
fornication, which is a misdemeanor under Massachusetts General Laws
Ann., c. 272, § 18. Aside from the scheme of values that assumption would
attribute to the State, it is abundantly clear that the effect of the ban on
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons has at best a marginal
relation to the proffered objective.
405 U.S. at 448. The Court pointed out that contraceptives designed to prevent
disease were widely available, legally and without prescription. Since the married
person who is entitled to obtain contraceptives on prescription need not be living
with his or her spouse and need not use the contraceptive exclusively during sexual
relations with the spouse, reason (c) above clearly fails to furnish a rational basis
for the statute.
If the reason for the statute was the protection of health, then the distinction
between married and unmarried persons is unjustified. Quoting the court of appeals,
the Court noted:
"If the prohibition [on distribution to unmarried persons] . . . is to be
taken to mean that the same physician who can prescribe for married
patients does not have sufficient skill to protect the health of patients who
lack a marriage certificate, or who may be currently divorced, it is illogical
to the point of irrationality."
405 U.S. at 451, quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401 (1st Cir. 1970)
(bracketed material by Supreme Court).
73 405 U.S. at 453.
7-410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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terminate her pregnancy." 76 After balancing the governmental
interests in protecting the health of the mother and the rights of the
embryo-fetus to life against this right of privacy, in order to dis-
cover the point at which the interest became "compelling," the
Court concluded that: prior to the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision rests with the pregnant woman and her doctor;
during the second trimester, regulations reasonably related to
maternal health may be imposed; during the third trimester (or
after the fetus is viable) the state may regulate to protect that fetal
life by prohibiting abortions except in cases where the regulation
would endanger the mother's life or health.77
Although criticism of Roe has been widespread,78 it is firmly
rooted in our constitutional law even if not, as some critics contend,
in the Constitution itself. As Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
forthrightly observes, the decision is a product of the doctrine of
substantive due process.79 Although the phrase "substantive due
process" has generally been avoided by the Court and the doctrine
itself has been thought to be moribund since the New Deal,80 it has
never completely disappeared. The individual rights recognized in
Meyer v. Nebraska s and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 82 retain their
vitality to this day. Moreover, contemporary decisions such as Roe,
76Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
77Id. 164-65. Any question whether this right was personal to the woman was
answered in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), in which the
Court declared invalid Missouri's requirement that the husband consent to abortions
performed on his wife. The Court also struck down a statutory requirement of
parental consent if the woman is an unmarried minor. It should be observed, how-
ever, that with respect to unwed minors a parental consent requirement that fell
short of granting the parents an absolute veto might pass muster. Id. 89, 90-91
(Stewart, J., concurring).
78 See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YA L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159; O'Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides
a Non-Case, 1974 Surp. CT. REV. 337.
79 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
80 See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
81262 U.S. 390 (1923). In this case, a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teach-
ing of any foreign language to school children who had not yet completed eighth
grade was found to violate due process. Because the Court did not believe that
knowledge of a foreign language could reasonably be regarded as harmful, the
statute was said to violate the teacher's right to teach and parents' right to have
their children instructed.
82268 U.S. 510 (1925). An Oregon statute prohibiting parents from sending
children between the ages of eight and sixteen to private schools was struck down




Griswold, and Loving v. Virginia 83 clearly involve the doctrine.
But the doctrine has been spottily applied without consistent
anchoring to jurisprudential principles.
In spite of the rather bold stroke for individual liberty repre-
sented by the result in Roe v. Wade, the latter day version of sub-
stantive due process remains a rather timid ghost of its former self.
Although the doctrine was formerly used to strike down social wel-
fare legislation and economic regmlation,8s it is now employed in
considerably less sweeping fashion to protect noneconomic and more
specific personal rights against governmental regulation.
Indeed, the liberty interest asserted by modern substantive due
process is most obviously characterized by its specificity-that is, its
narrowness. Individual liberty or "personal privacy," as it is cur-
rently termed, includes the right to marry the person of one's choice
(presumably as long as that person is of the opposite sex, unmarried,
and not one's brother or sister 85), and once married a couple must
be left free to make reasonable choices about the education and
upbringing of any children of the marriage and to utilize contra-
ceptive devices. Whether married or single an individual may not
be restricted by governmental action from reasonable access to
contraceptives, or prosecuted for possessing, in the privacy of the
home, material that is concededly obscene by the Court's own ever-
shifting standards. A woman has the right to make a decision about
the continuation of a normal pregnancy under the aegis of her at-
tending physician but largely free from state interference until the
fetus is viable.
The spotty protection afforded by the privacy decisions does
not simply reflect a dearth of decided cases in the domain of in-
83 388 U.S. 1 (1967). This case declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes
unconstitutional as violative of both equal protection and due process under the
fourteenth amendment. In its short discussion of due process, the Court observed
that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. 12.
8 4 E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Although the high water
mark of judicial interference with legislative attempts to regulate the economy was
not reached until the 1930's, see McCloskey, supra note 80, Lochner is symbolic of
all the worst attributes of substantive due process. See generally Stephenson, The
Supreme Court and Constitutional Change: Lochner v. New York Revisited, 21
yVin.. L. REv. 217 (1976).
85Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), recognized the right to marry the
person of one's choice, but nothing in that case would justify applying this principle
to homosexual, incestuous or bigamous marriages. See Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) (prosecution for bigamy does not violate first amendment);
Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972) (Griswold and Loving distinguished in suit by homosexuals seeking
the right to marry each other); Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to
Marry, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 358 (1968).
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dividual liberty; rather, it betrays an affirmative pattern of narrow
decision and constriction by the Court. Stanley, of course, has been
limited to its facts by Paris Adult Theatre L86 Roe can hardly be
read broadly enough to find application beyond the abortion issue,
as the Court commented that "it is not clear to us that the claim
asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with
one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of
privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions." 87 The Roe
Court in fact refrained from generalizing about the individual
liberty that protects the woman's role in the abortion decision.
Griswold and Eisenstadt seem susceptible of only slightly
broader application. One area in which the privacy rights articu-
lated in those cases might be applicable is in criminal proscriptions
against sodomy, fornication, and adultery. The majority's railing
against pornography in Paris Adult Theatre I, however, indicates
that the present Court would agree with the assertion in Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold that the Griswold de-
cision "in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of
sexual promiscuity or misconduct." 88 The most apposite Supreme
Court decision on this point came in Doe v. Commonwealth's At-
torney 89 in which the Court affirmed, without opinion, the decision
of a three-judge district court that refused to invalidate the Virginia
sodomy statute.90 Although perhaps more specific than its counter-
parts in many other states, 91 the Virginia statute is certainly not
86 See Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 71 (1974).
87 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). For a discussion of the jurispru-
dential debate over governmental paternalism, see text accompanying notes 121-25
infra.
88381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
89Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd,
425 U.S. 902 (1976).
90 When suit was brought, the statute, since repealed, read:
Crimes against nature.-If any person shall carnally know in any manner
any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus
or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge,
he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the peniten-
tiary not less than one year or more than three years.
VA. ConE § 18.1-212 (1960) (repealed 1975).
91 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 272 § §34-35 (1972):
§ 34 Sodomy and Buggery.
Whoever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature,
either with mankind or with a beast, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for not more than twenty years.
§ 35 Unnatural and Lascivious Acts.
Whoever commits any unnatural and lascivious act with another person
shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one
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atypical. The challenge in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney was
instituted by adult, male homosexuals who sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, asserting that the statute was unconstitutional on
its face and as applied to them because they allegedly faced the
threat of prosecution.
In a two to one decision, the district court rejected the plain-
tiffs' contentions. Griswold was thought inapplicable because homo-
sexual activity "is obviously no portion of marriage, home or family
life .... ," 92 The majority felt that Virginia fulfilled its obliga-
tion to show a "rationally supportable" interest because "[flunda-
mentally, the State action is simply directed to the suppression of
crime, whether committed in public or private." 93 Although the
majority apparently regarded this circular response as more than
adequate, it proceeded to observe that homosexual "conduct is likely
to end in a contribution to moral delinquency." o4 Doe presents
quite a paradigmatic case of prosecution for activity that perceptibly
affects at most the intangible "decency" of society, because the pro-
hibition could not be said to stem from public health considerations,
from a fear that homosexual activity breeds violent crime, or as a
promotion of population growth. Only if society may punish con-
duct that is immoral by majoritarian values does a legitimate govern-
ment interest underlying the Virginia sodomy law exist.95
thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than
five years in jail or in the house of correction for not more than two and
one half years.
In Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974), the defend-
ant was convicted of violating § 35 for allegedly forcing a woman to perform an act
of fellatio on him and compelling her "'to put . . . [her] tongue on his backside."'
Id. at 299, 318 N.E.2d at 479 (bracketed material by Massachusetts Supreme Court).
The court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
Balthazar, but went on to observe that "§ 35 must be construed to be inapplicable
to private, consensual conduct of adults .... [because] the concept of general
community disapproval of specific sexual conduct, which is inherent in § 35, requires
such an interpretation." Id. at 302, 318 N.E.2d at 481. The court refused, however,
to base this dictum on constitutional grounds.
92403 F. Supp. at 1202.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 As I look at the matter, we are investigating in this part of our inquiry a
course of conduct which is contrary to the best interests of the community,
and one which can have very serious effects on the whole moral fabric of
social life. It is one of those forms of conduct falling within the group to
which the words of the Street Offences Committee ... apply as being
.conduct it has always been thought right to bring within the scope of the
criminal law on account of the injury which they occasion to the public in
general.' The influence of example in forming the views and developing
the characters of young people can scarcely be overestimated .... If the
recommendation be adopted, the moral force of the law will be weakened.
I am convinced that the main body of the community recognizes clearly the
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Although Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney may not have been
the appropriate vehicle for so ruling, the Virginia statute is clearly
void in at least one respect. To the extent that a lawfully married
couple might be prosecuted for engaging in the proscribed conduct
in the privacy of their home, the law presumably runs afoul of
Griswold.9 6 Attempts to use the Griswold-Eisenstadt dichotomy to
overturn convictions of unmarried adults for heterosexual sodomy,
however, have met with only limited success,97 perhaps because the
factual setting of cases raising this issue often involved conduct that
was not purely private or, more commonly, was part of an alleged
sexual assault.
moral force of the criminal law of the land. Many citizens, it must be
admitted, regard the prohibitions expressly imposed by the law as the
utmost limits set to their activities and are prepared to take full advantage
of any omission or relaxation. It would be surprising if there are not con-
siderable numbers with this philosophy among those with whom we are
concerned in this inquiry, and the removal of the present prohibition from
the criminal code will be regarded as condoning or licensing licentiousness,
and will open up for such people a new field of permitted conduct with
unwholesome and distasteful implications.
TREPORT OF T DEPAiRTmmNTAL CoMMrEE ON HomosExuAL. OFFENsEs AND TosTi-
'lOTION f 61 (1957) (dissenting opinion of James Adair), reprinted in L. BLoM!-
CooPFa & G. DaEwRy, LAw AN MoRA~rry 18 (1976).
96 A number of cases suggest this result. In Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968), a sodomy conviction was reversed in
a habeas corpus action because the court did not believe Cotner understood that
Griswold might provide a constitutionally required consent defense. Thus, the court
ruled that his guilty plea should not have been accepted. In Lovisi v. Slayton, 539
F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), the court affirmed denial of habeas corpus relief sought
by a husband and wife convicted of sodomy. The acts in question, however, in-
volved a third person; the Lovisis were each convicted on a count charging sodomy
with each other, and Mrs. Lovisi was convicted on another count involving sodomy
with the third person. The Lovisis also took pictures of some of the acts in question,
and the matter came to the attention of authorities when pictures were taken to
school by Mrs. Lovisi's teenage daughters. The court of appeals reasoned that the
petitioners had waived a constitutional privacy defense by, in effect, admitting out-
siders to their marital intimacies. In State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976), the defendant's conviction of sodomy and lewd
and lascivious acts was affirmed. The trial court had instructed the jury that consent
was a defense, and this instruction was regarded by the court as satisfying the
constitutional objections raised. An intermediate appellate court had earlier reversed
Batemans conviction on the ground that consent was a constitutionally required
defense and the statute could not be interpreted as permitting such a defense. State
v. Bateman, 25 Ariz. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975), vacated, 113 Ariz. 197, 547 P.2d 6,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976). See also State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348
(Iowa 1976); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973); State v. Elliott,
88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (1975). See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636 (1974).
97 See, e.g., State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), aff'd,
113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976); State v.
Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207
(1975); Annot., supra note 96.
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A typical example of the latter group of heterosexual sodomy
cases, State v. Lair,98 involved a conviction for rape and sodomy.
The defendant contended that Griswold would make the New
Jersey sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied to married couples
and consequently Eisenstadt would make the application of the
statute to consensual sodomy practiced by unmarried adults a denial
of equal protection. Consent, therefore, was a constitutionally re-
quired defense to a prosecution under the statute. Although the
New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that Griswold would have the
effect urged if a married couple were prosecuted for sodomy under
the statute, it refused to accept the Eisenstadt argument. Although
the court noted that Eisenstadt did not involve the right of marital
privacy, citing a Maryland case refusing to so apply Eisenstadt, it
did not answer the argument.
Lair hardly seems to be a correct reading of Griswold-Eisen-
stadt. If Griswold completely prohibits prosecution of consensual
sodomy practiced in private by a married couple, and if Eisenstadt
is a purely equal protection case premised upon the right recognized
in Griswold, it is difficult to see how the state may more legitimately
prosecute private, consensual, heterosexual sodomy between unmar-
ried people than the use of contraceptives by the same people. If
Eisenstadt had been a due process case that found no valid state
interest in prosecuting for the use of contraception regardless of the
user, the distinction drawn in Lair would be much easier, at least
superficially, to maintain. Eisenstadt, however, did not so hold,
and the refusal to apply it in Lair betrays a hidden judgment re-
specting the morality of consensual sodomy.
A few courts have been willing to give the privacy rights dis-
cussed above a very broad reading in order to invalidate sodomy
statutes as facially invalid. In State v. Elliot,99 the New Mexico
Supreme Court so held, sua sponte, in an appeal from a conviction
for sodomy and burglary. The court found that New Mexico's
sodomy statute violated the right of marital privacy recognized in
Griswold and then went on to read Eisenstadt as requiring similar
treatment for consenting, unmarried adults. They further recog-
nized a right of privacy in the home, citing Stanley and Ravin, also
violated by this statute. Although the defendant did not seem to
fit into any of these categories himself, the court held that he could
assert the rights of parties that would be violated by the statute's
overbreadth.
98 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
q-988 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (1975).
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The conflicting and sometimes illogical decisions generated in
the modem domain of substantive due process manifest an under-
lying uncertainty respecting the appropriate method of constitu-
tional analysis, and, often, an insensitivity to the jurisprudential
roots of individual liberty. In the Supreme Court, both majority
and individual opinions have tended toward polar views. The
dominant approach recently has been to formulate very narrowly
defined types of individual liberty, such as the Stanley right to
possess obscenity in the home, the Griswold right to privacy in the
marital relation, and the decisional privacy enunciated in Roe v.
Wade, and then to examine the legislative purpose to see if some
compelling interest justifies the intrusion upon the new-found
liberty. If this crystallizing of discrete personal rights is somewhat
analogous to the incorporation doctrine most prominently displayed
in criminal procedure cases, 00 one might also expect to find a highly
generalized formulation of privacy theory whereby due process pro-
tects those rights that are "implicit in a concept of ordered lib-
erty." 101 The vice of both extremes is largely the same-very little
guidance is given to the lower federal and state courts that must
either engage in the elusive search for the scope and authority of the
penumbral right defined in Griswold, or must continually face the
challenge of rebalancing individual and state interests inherent in
the "ordered liberty" thesis. The balance of this Article attempts
the first step in articulating a principled modern theory of substan-
tive due process by placing the question in the context of a tradi-
tional jurisprudence of individual rights.
II.
No serious philosopher or jurist would contend that individual
liberty means the right of a person to do anything he wishes. In
the words of John Locke, "though this be a state of liberty, yet it is
not a state of licence .... ,, 102 The need for some degree of
restraint creates the basic relationship between the individual and
the government. Although the current function of government is
more complex than ever before and promises to increase in com-
plexity, the basic role of government remains unchanged. Govern-
ment exists primarily to provide security for the persons and prop-
100E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.s. 1 (1964).
101 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
102 J. LoCKE, OF CIVIL GovzRNm-NT 119 (1924) (1st ed. London 1690).
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erty of its citizens, and it does so by placing limits on the lawful
actions of its citizens.
In describing the power of government formed by the social
contract of the people, Locke observed:
A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the
arbitrary power of another; and having, in the state of
Nature, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or posses-
sion of another, but only so much as the law of Nature
g ave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of
mankind, this is all he doth, or can give up to the common-
wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the
legislative can have no more than this. Their power in
the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of
society. It is a power that hath no other end but preserva-
tion . . .10
Historically, the two approaches taken toward this basic prop-
osition are similar to the divergent modern views of constitutional
protection of privacy.10 4 Locke himself and natural law theorists
might inquire as to the essential and inalienable elements of liberty.
The school of sociological jurisprudence, exemplified by the writings
of Dean Roscoe Pound, would balance the government's interest in
providing security against the demand of individual liberty.1 5
The approach of Locke and of natural law proponents is based upon
a belief in absolute values; 108 there is a certain composition to
liberty to which time and custom are irrelevant. Nature or some
other source of authority higher than positive law has established an
order that man must discover and toward which he must aspire.
However attractive the notion of absolute values may seem, changing
social and political conditions have rendered the search an exercise
in futility. The quest has not been pointless, however. Because
of the influence of natural law theory, many revered doctrines and
principles have been integrated into positive law. The Bill of
Rights with its enumeration of inalienable guarantees is an example
of such influence.
The Bill of Rights guarantees that comprise our basic under-
standing of individual liberty may find their origin in natural law
absolutism, but the interpretation of these guarantees may never-
theless require the reconciliation of competing interests. Pound
103 Id. 185.
10 4 See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
105 R. PoUND, CoaNTrpoRA.4Y Jumrsc Tnmort 57-83 (1940).
106 See W. Fi anMAoN, LEGAL THEonY 95-156 (5th ed. 1967).
1977]
368 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
believes that "it is convenient to classify the interests of which the
legal order must take account as individual or public or social." 107
Although he points out that all interests are those of individual
human beings, most interests are shared by others and may be re-
garded as joint or social interests. Nevertheless, social interests may
not necessarily also be classified as individual interests. Indeed,
Julius Stone concluded that the category "public" interest is
superfluous:
The main "public interests" in Professor Pound's view, are,
first, the interests of the state as a juristic person, compris-
ing its interests of "personality" and "substance", and
second, the interests of the state as a guardian of social
interests. But these latter consist merely of certain social
interests, which can be considered as such, looked at from
the viewpoint of official superintendence and initiative in
their legal enforcement. The official superintendence and
initiative is no reason for creating a class of "public
interests" any more than the fact that some social in-
terests are secured by the criminal law is a reason for
doing so. °s
Stone makes a necessary and important distinction between
those interests of the state as a juristic entity, which assume a sepa-
rate and unique character, and those interests that the state protects
as a vehicle for enforcing the will of the majority. The latter
category clearly represents a common interest of society in prevent-
ing harm to others. But the former class of interests is more ques-
tionable in that the state has no legitimate interest of its own that
outweighs individual liberty-the state has no identity beyond the
collective interests and identities of its citizens. To enforce interests
premised on the "tone" or "decency" of society is to assert just such
a "personality" interest of the state, which is not properly within its
sphere of concern.
In the instance of individual actions viewed by a majority of
society as immoral and punished as such through the criminal law,
a balance must be struck between the right of an individual to
follow his conscience (or perhaps to disregard his conscience), and
the rights of others, individually and collectively, to be secure in
their persons and property.10 9 Obviously, some individual actions,
107R. PouND, supra note 105, at 61.
108 J. SToNE, TR PRoviNcE ANn FUNCrIoN OF L w 492 (1950).
'
0 9 The right to be secure in one's person and property is not easily defined.
In describing the limitations nature places upon man's actions, Locke said that "no
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such as murder, rape, larceny, and fraud, however desirable they
may seem to the actor, are clearly violative of the rights of others
and the collective interests of society under any philosophical con-
struct. Societal condemnation of other conduct such as marijuana
use, consensual sodomy, and abortion is not so clearly necessary to
the legitimate functions of government.
A balancing process has widespread acceptance in the American
legal system in the formulation of constitutional doctrine." 0 Ameri-
can government, national and state, is limited by a constitution that
specifically protects certain individual rights against majority au-
thority."' The natural law personal liberties reserved to the people
in the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment " 2 are not
specific and self-executing, however. Although strict construction-
ists like the late Justice Black may argue for a literal interpretation
of various amendments, 13 one suspects that balancing nevertheless
occurs in defining the scope of the "absolute" right in question.
What are the demands of societal security that legitimate the
coercion of individual members of society? This is the question to
which John Stuart Mill delivered what he believed to be an absolute
and timeless answer:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple prin-
ciple, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society
with the individual in the way of compulsion and control,
whether the means used be physical force in the form of
legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.
one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions..... J. LocKE,
supra note 102. The difficult questions concerning the morality and legitimacy of
governmental regulation of conduct through criminal sanctions do not arise in those
instances in which the punished conduct inflicted some observable physical harm
upon another's person or property. They arise in those situations where the pur-
ported "criminal" conduct caused, at worst, some intangible harm to other people or,
more typically, to such ephemeral values as the "right of the Nation and of the
States to maintain a decent society ...." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199
(1964) (Warren, CJ., dissenting). Any effort to define the reach of legitimate
governmental interests in protecting the persons and property of its citizens ultimately
poses the same difficult questions as those found in defining the precise nature of
individual freedom from the coercive restraints of government. Any attempt to
define individual liberty premised on an arbitrarily restrictive definition of govern-
mental interests in protecting the security of its citizens would be circular reasoning.
Accordingly, no effort will be made at any such precise definition.
110 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
111 See W. FamDmANN, supra note 106, at 419-21.
112 Id. 136-51.
133 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting);
A. BIcKE=, TBE LEAsT DANGERous BANcH 93-97 (1962).
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That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which -power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or for-
bear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good
reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him,
or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for com-
pelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do
otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is
desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil
to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one,
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 114
Central to Mill's formulation is the concept of "harm to others."
His work reveals that ultimately he was no more capable than others
who sought to define this concept.
Two arguments may be raised against Mill's theory that do not
rely on a theoretical underpinning of the phrase "harm to others."
The first and clearest line of dispute was initially espoused by Mill's
most critical contemporary, Judge James Fitzjames Stephen. In
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,"5 written as an answer to Mill, Judge
Stephen adopted what H. L. A. Hart has characterized as an "ex-
treme thesis." 116 Under this approach, "the enforcement of moral-
ity is regarded as a thing of value, even if immoral acts harm no one
directly, or indirectly by weakening the moral cement of society." 117
Even the majority opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 18
would not go so far as Stephen does in asserting that there are no
114J. M ILL, ON LBERTY (1859), reprinted in J. BENra, TBE UnA-rrAN. s
483-84 (1961). This passage was quoted by Justice Kavanaugh of the Michigan
Supreme Court in the decision reversing John Sinclair's conviction for marijuana
possession, discussed more fully at note 9 supra. People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91,
133, 194 N.W.2d 878, 896 (1972).
15 J. STF.P.N, LiBERTY, EQUALrrY, FRAThEummrY (P J. White ed. 1967).
116 H. L. A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MoaALrrY 48-60 (1963).
117 Id. 49.
118 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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substantive limits that may be legitimately imposed on the will of
the majority. Stephen's attitude is suitably characterized as "ex-
treme"; such a theory is repugnant to even the most grudging con-
ception of liberty." 9 The restriction of individual liberty for no
better reason than the will of the majority, no matter how strong
their conviction or repugnance at a particular course of conduct, is,
as Mill suggested, a "tyranny of the majority." 120 Such a philosophy
is certainly at odds with the spirit and intention of our Federal
Constitution, if not the specific language in many situations.
Another line of dispute that might be taken with Mill's general
proposition would be to question his assertion that the individual,
freely in control of his own destiny, should have the right to engage
in conduct harmful only to himself. Proponents of the opposite
view believe that government intervention solely to protect indi-
viduals from self-inflicted harm is legitimate.' 2' They further dis-
pute Mill in asserting that it is difficult to envision a pure example
of conduct involving no risk of "harm to others."
119 judge Stephens views were extreme but not absolute. Consider, for exam-
ple, the following excerpt:
The real difference between Mr. Mill's doctrine and mine is this. We agree
that the minority are wise and the majority foolish, but Mr. Mill denies that
the wise minority are ever justified in coercing the foolish majority for their
own good, whereas I affirm that under circumstances they may be justified
in doing so. Mr. Morley says that Mr. Mill's principle would protect the
minority from being coerced by the majority, whereas my principle would
expose them to such coercion. My answer is that in my opinion the wise
minority are the rightful masters of the foolish majority; and that it is mean
and cowardly in them to deny the right to coerce altogether for fear of its
being misapplied as against themselves. The horse is stronger than the
rider in one sense, but a man who maintained that horses and men ought
to be entirely independent of each other for fear of the horses riding the
men would be a very poor creature. In many respects one wise man is
stronger than a million fools. The one man in a million who possesses
extraordinary intellect, force of character, and force of sympathy is more
likely to coerce the rest than they are to coerce him, and I affirm his right
in certain cases to do so. Mr. Mill is so timid about the coercion of the one
man (who has no business to permit himself to be coerced) by the many,
that he lays down a principle which confines the one man to a way of acting
on his fellow creatures which is notoriously inoperative with the vast
majority of them.
I. Srp=, supra note 115, at 32.
120 J. MILT, supra note 114, at 478.
121 The force of any such argument ultimately depends upon one's willingness
to assume that the individuals in a society, or at least some of them, are incapable
of making rational or informed decisions about their own wellbeing. Such an
assumption has clearly been made in American jurisdictions with respect to indi-
viduals who have not attained the age of majority or who suffer from some mental
disease or defect. Whatever might be said about the legitimacy or wisdom of
statutes placing restrictions on the rights of minors and incompetents, they are an
established part of our legal system and are not questioned here.
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Even these proponents of government paternalism who would
not restrict government intervention to situations involving harm
to others cannot argue absolutely that the government may intervene
to prevent all actions that harm only the actor. The motivation of
the actor must be considered in evaluating whether society will allow
an individual to take risk upon himself. Ironically, society tolerates
dangerous actions taken out of both altruism and the desire for
financial gain.
Mill proposed a hypothetical in which the only harm would fall
upon the actor himself. He posits the example of a person who
wishes to walk across a dangerous bridge,ua suggesting that unless
the person were under age or not fully possessed of his reasoning
capacities, we might do no more than warn him of the bridge's
danger. If the person wished to proceed in spite of the danger,
then he should be free to do so. Under Mill's construct, it must be
assumed that, should this person fall from the bridge, his death
would cause no harm to any other person. Any harm to others,
such as the danger to those standing below or the termination of
financial support of those who depend upon this individual, would
justify the proscription of such conduct.
123
If under Mill's test it could be said that no harm would result
to others, although this is admittedly highly unlikely, it is difficult
to construct a consistent theory in support of government restraint.
Society would hardly censure an individual who was crossing the
bridge to assist another person in distress. What if he were doing
so for financial gain? We frequently permit individuals to under-
take grievous risks for uncertain gain under situations presenting a
greater risk of harm to others than in Mill's hypothetical. What of
mountain climbers, or motorcycle daredevils? Would a theory
tolerating certain types of "harm to oneself" allow an individual to
end his life because of extreme pain from some terminal illness?
The point is simply that, aside from the government's right to
interfere with action that would harm others, none would argue that
action that harms only the actor is always suppressible. Even those
who uphold such paternalistic interference by the state must draw a
line within the latter class of activities. Although he accepts most
of Mill's general theory, Hart differs sharply on this question.12
122 J. MML, supra note 114, at 576.
123 The potential "harm to others" discussed in this section of the text cuts
much broader than the attempted definition of this phrase in later sections of the
text. See text accompanying notes 143-44 infra.
124 H. L. A. HART, supra note 116, at 30-34.
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Referring to Mill's criticisms of laws restricting or prohibiting the
sale of drugs, Hart says that Mill carried his protests to fantastic
lengths, suggesting a parallel between these views and the laissez
faire economic doctrine of Mill's day. Generally Hart observes that
people do not really make the kind of free choices as to their destiny
that Mill's doctrine would suppose, undercutting Mill's assumption
that some individual actions indeed pose no harm to others.
Mill's theories as to self-destructive action are hardly as in-
credible as Hart declares, however. Treatment of such actions in
American criminal law is far from consistent, and, on the whole,
few regulations are aimed solely at protecting the offender. Prose-
cution for attempted suicide is practically unheard of. One need
only read Paris Adult Theatre I to know that laws directed at the
sale and use of pornography are motivated more by a concern for
the "decency" or "tone" of society or a desire to punish the pur-
veyors of these commodities, rather than a sincere wish to protect
the user from himself. The same may plausibly be said for pro-
scriptions of the sale or use of drugs or alcohol. Even motorcycle
helmet laws have been upheld against due process attack by hypothe-
sized rationales stressing protection of individuals other than the
cyclist.' 25 Moreover, many dangerous or self-destructive acts moti-
vated by a desire for thrills or financial gain are permitted, simply
because such acts are not regarded as immoral. Most, if not all,
self-destructive acts punished by the criminal law in this country
are proscribed primarily because of some real or imagined "harm to
others," although no consistent standard for such a finding appears
to exist.
Mill's own interpretation of "harm to others" is scarcely more
elucidating. In describing the standards of conduct that individuals
should observe toward the rest of society, Mill set out two general
duties: first, that conduct may not injure those interests of others
which, "either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding,
ought to be considered as rights"; 126 and secondly, each must bear
his "share of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the
society or its members from injury and molestation." 127 These
125 See, e.g., Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1972); Everhardt v.
City of New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968), appeal dismissed, 395
U.S. 212 (1969); State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968). Cf.
State v. Lee, 51 Haw. 516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970) (upholding helmet law designed
primarily to mitigate harm that motorcyclist may visit upon himself). See generally
Comment, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill,
37 U. Cmr. L. RIv. 605 (1970).
126 J. MILL, supra note 114, at 552.
127 Id. (parenthetical omitted).
1977]
;374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"duties" do little to clarify the concept of "harm to others," and the
second is particularly unenlightening. Obviously, any type of self-
,destructive action could be considered a violation of this latter duty.
-The alcoholic or drug addict has certainly decreased his usefulness
to society. As Lord Devlin observed, "A nation of debauchees would
,not in 1940 have responded satisfactorily to Winston Churchill's call
to bloodand toil and sweat and tears." 128
Despite the ambiguity of Mill's language, he would presumably
,require a direct and perceptible harm to others. He states:
Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite
risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public,
the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed
in that of morality or law.
But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may
be called, constructive injury which'a person causes to
society, by conduct which neither violates, any specific duty
to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assign-
able individual except himself; the inconvenience is one
which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater
good of human freedom.1
29
Of course, this articulation is still unclear. As Professor Packer
has observed:
To begin with, it has to be conceded that Mill's formula'
solves very little. Later in his essay Mill extends his con-
cept of "harm to others" to, include "risk of damage" to'the
interests of others, and it is usually possible to make a more
or less plausible argument that any given form of conduct
involves that risk in some way. The question is not one
of whether or not there will be harm done; it is one of the
remoteness and probability of the harm. Some things are
inore harmful than others. Homicide is more harmful
than muttering voodoo incantations; rape is more harmful
than reading dirty books. And in a world of limited re-
sources, we need to draw discriminations about the gravity
and remoteness of harms. Seen in this light, "harm to
others" is a prudential criterion rather than a hard and fast
distinction of principle.180
Although Mill's principles axe far from precise, they furnish a suffi-
ciently positive statement of policy to demarcate Mill and his moder n
128 Devlin, Mill on Liberty in Morals, 32 U. Cm. L. Rv. 215, 224 (1965)
129 J. MmT., supra note 120, at 560.
130 H. PACKm, THE LIs oF T E Cmn%'AL SAWcrior 266 (1968).
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critics who would define "harm to others" in broader fashion to
encompass whatever is considered morally reprehensible by the
majority of society.
Debate over this issue has been sparked anew in England in
recent years, primarily between Lord Patrick Devlin and Professor
H. L. A. Hart. The impetus for this renewal of interest was largely
furnished by the Report of the Departmental Committee on Homo-
sexual Offenses and Prostitution, commonly known as the Wolfenden
Report. That study recommended that private homosexual conduct
between consenting adults no longer be made criminal, and that
prostitution offenses be limited. The Committee observed that,
with regard to sexual morality, the function of the criminal law was
to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen
from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient
safeguards against the exploitation and corruption of
others, particularly those who are specially vulnerable be-
cause they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced,
or in a state of special physical, official or economic de-
pendence.
131
Using language strongly reminiscent of Mill, the Committee
stated, "Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting
through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with
that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and im-
morality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's busi-
ness." 132 This statement of philosophy, perhaps to a greater extent
than the Committee's actual recommendations, elicited Lord
Devlin's dissent.
Lord Devlin's basic argument is that society, or a majority of
its members, has a right to establish certain moral standards. 33
These standards are based upon moral principles so deeply held by a
majority of citizens as to form an integral and indispensable part
of the societal framework. Violation of these moral precepts
threatens the very foundations of society. Apparently Devlin would
identify these elementary moral principles by gauging the reaction
to their violation. If society reacts with "intolerance, indignation
and disgust," then the moral principles are elementary. 34
131 REPORT OF THE Commasrrr ON HOmOSEXAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION,
CmtND. No. 247, at 9-10 (1957).
132 Id. 24.
13 3 See P. DEVLaN, THE ENrocmrENr OF MOALS (1965); Devlin, supra note
128. For an analysis of Lord Devlin's position, see Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the
Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE LJ. 986 (1966).
134 P. DEvLN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORAlS 17 (1965).
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Devlin's rationale is clearly appropriate for such obviously
antisocial acts as murder or robbery. In these instances, the joint
interests of all individuals are well defined and uniformly endorse
the punishment of such conduct. Societal moral standards need not
be the basis for justifying the punishment of murder; the threat to
individual liberty posed by murder is self-evident. When other
crimes such as consensual sex offenses and peddling pornography
are considered, however, reliance upon "elementary moral prin-
ciples" becomes necessary to justify Lord Devlin's position. This
approach prompts Professor Hart to say that Lord Devlin regards
morality as a "seamless web." 135 For Devlin, permitting any form
of immorality to go unpunished, even though it is merely homo-
sexual conduct or drunkenness, threatens all of society's moral fiber.
Professor Ronald Dworkin perceives another facet to Lord
Devlin's argument.18 6 He sees in Devlin's position a recognition
that the legislature is delegated authority to make moral decisions in
order to preserve and maintain certain environmental and insti-
tutional values. These values are then entitled to legal protection
from those whose immoral activities threaten to undermine them.
Under this analysis, immorality may be roughly equated with
treason.1'3
7
Dworkin adds a gloss to Devlin's theory by identifying the
"master plan" of the legislature as the source of moral precepts
rather than Devlin's vaguely articulated notion of social custom and
moral vision. Perhaps Dworkin's refinement is in recognizing the
necessary element of arbitrariness in allowing the legislature to
carry out society's ethical consensus. His refinement may not be
entirely persuasive, however. Legislative action to proscribe "im-
moral" acts is probably compelled simply by widely and strongly
felt public distaste for certain conduct, or by a legislative prejudice
or vague opinion that certain conduct is harmful and must there-
fore be suppressed.
Lord Devlin's work may have been intended as prescriptive, but
its basic impact is more descriptive of current practice. It reflects
the realities of our legal system better than the analysis of any other
commentator or philosopher. Lord Devlin would presumably have
little difficulty accepting the analysis of the majority in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton. 38 Even though the Supreme Court has been
135 H. L. A. HART, supra note 116, at 51.
136 See Dworkin, supra note 133.
137 See H. L. A. HART, supra note 116, at 49.
138 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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less than consistent in its recognition of various individual liberties,
by refusing to require the state to demonstrate that its criminal pro-
scriptions are directed at actions causing tangible harm to others,
the Court falls much closer to Lord Devlin than to Mill.
Lord Devlin pays at least lip service to Mill's general criterion
of "harm to others," but his expansive interpretation of that con-
cept is wholly alien to Mill's own application and interpretation.
Devlin's leading contemporary critic, Professor Hart, endorses many
of Mill's views, but, as the discussion of paternalism indicates, he
does not accept Mill's doctrine in its entirety. 13 9 Hart disagrees with
Devlin's societal view of "harm to others" in large part because he
does not accept Devlin's "factual" assertion that violation of certain
moral codes will undermine the structure of society. 40 Hart's con-
cept of "harm to others," however, also differs from Mill's. He
would justify some criminal laws on the grounds that a defendant
himself constitutes a "nuisance" to society.' 4' This ambiguous term
is never precisely defined by Hart, and it would seem that by such
characterizations of various types of proscribed immoral conduct,
one could ultimately arrive at a position that does not differ greatly
from Devlin's.
42
In order for the concept of individual liberty to have an
acceptable substantive content, some definition of harm to society
close to Mill's original conception should be chosen. The formula-
tion of such a constitutional principle should be neutral and flexible
with respect to specific types of governmental action. 43 It should
139 See H. L. A. HART, supra note 116.
'40 Id. 50.
141Id. 41.
142 Hart himself, of course, did not arrive at Devlin's position. He distinguishes
private actions from their public display, and would outlaw private consensual acts
only for their necessarily public consequences. Bigamy, a public declaration of
infidelity, is Harts only example of a "nuisance." Id.
143 See A. Bcmnu, ThE SurnExas CourT AND um IDEA oF Paocnuss (1970);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAav. L. REv. 1
(1959). A recent Article, Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on
(and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1976), criticizes the Alaska
Supreme Court decision in Ravin for apparently endorsing the libertarian political
views of John Stuart Mill and elevating them to constitutional status. "Whether or
not the Alaska Constitution enacts Mill's On Liberty, surely the United States Con-
stitution no more enacts On Liberty than it enacts Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics." Id. 434 (footnotes omitted). The final footnote to this sentence cites Mr.
Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner and poses the apparently unanswerable
question: "By what imaginable warrant could the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court defensibly impose Mill's political philosophy on the American
people?" Id. n.110 (emphasis in original).
Although the present Article presumes to do no more than suggest that Mill's
political philosophy provides a reasonable frame of reference for evaluating the
constitutional validity of criminal laws, I feel compelled to offer at least a partial
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not forever sanctify certain types of conduct, by placing the prosecu-
tion of private homosexual acts, the procreation of children, or
motorcycle riding without a helmet, for example, beyond the power
of the government to regulate or proscribe. Such rigid formula-
tions are a denial of the balancing process that must always be used
in accommodating the individual's interest in personal liberty with
the legitimate interests of society in protecting the persons and
property of all citizens. A suggested test to be applied when con-
sidering the validity of a criminal statute faced with a due process
challenge is: Does the conduct proscribed under this statute entail
a substantial risk of direct physical, emotional, or financial harm to
individuals not consenting to the conduct in question?
This rule is an adaptation of Mill and a reflection of the
balance that must be struck between individual and societal
interests. It obviously does not represent a precise formula, how-
ever. What does "substantial" mean? How much physical, emo-
tional or financial harm should be countenanced, if any? It is
impossible to quantify conduct so as to give a precise answer to
these questions. Rulings as to the validity of specific statutes must
emanate from an application of the formula in the light of both
its policy and philosophical underpinnings. The principle would
not exist in a vacuum; rather, it would acquire more precise mean-
ing after its application to specific cases, which in turn furnish a
reservoir of precedential sources. The formula should ultimately
be viewed, as Justice Harlan urged, with regard to the phrase "due
process of law":
response to Professor Pery's general comment. In my opinion, a philosophy asserting
that the forces of a free market must be permitted to control the economic life of
the nation, regardless of the consequences in terms of "harm" to the citizenry,
ultimately conflicts with a philosophy that requires government to refrain from
coercing its citizens except where there is a demonstrable harm or threat of harm
to other citizens if the government fails to act. On Liberty is no more analogous to
the economic Darwinism epitomized by Social Statics than democracy is analogous
to anarchy. Moreover, I believe that Mill's philosophy really goes to the processes
of government; it tries to identify the kinds of factors government should weigh
before deciding to take action in some area. Laissez faire economic philosophy, on
the other hand, involves a particular substantive decision that its adherents would
require government to make, that is, let the commercial sector take care of itself
without governmental interference and the country will be better off.
Professor Perry would apply a doctrine of substantive due process that would
require laws aimed at "promoting the public morals and serving no other purpose,"
id. 443 (footnote omitted), to be compared with "conventional morality" for the
purpose of deciding whether the law truly reflects the "public morals," id. 441-51.
Freely admitting the difficulties in defining the concept of "harm to others," I never-
theless find it conceptually superior to an approach based upon a search for "con-
ventional morality." Professor Perry's approach seems to mirror the philosophical




Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its con-
tent cannot be determined by reference to any code. The
best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society. If the supplying of content
to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges
have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance
struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well
as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is
a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically
departs from it could not long survive, while a decision
which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.
No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.'44
Although Harlan's overall philosophy would not necessarily square
with that embodied in the formula recommended here, his approach
to constitutional interpretation is consistent.
The above rule amounts to a "neutral principle" in the only
meaningful sense. It is not neutral in the sense that it expresses no
policy or prejudice against certain types of governmental action; it
is neutral, however, in that it does not purport to be a rigid, hard-
and-fast delineation of the acceptable and unacceptable. It does not
purport to decide specific cases beyond the purview of the immediate
controversy.
The proposed rule must be elevated to the level of a constitu-
tional standard. "Due process of law," as that phrase is used in the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, is widely recognized to entail a
substantive meaning beyond the procedural interpretation that the
words themselves suggest. The incorporation of the first amend-
ment into the fourteenth is a rather obvious example of substantive
due process, as is the right of marital privacy adopted in Griswold
and the right of a woman to make decisions about securing an
abortion. 145 Various Supreme Court cases recognize a substantive
content to the concept of individual liberty, sanctioned by the re-
144 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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quirement of due process that transcends the literal meaning of the
Bill of Rights.
To the extent, however, that the Court ventures beyond the
literal language of specific constitutional provisions in finding and
enforcing substantive individual rights, it becomes vulnerable to
charges that it is operating as a "super-legislature." Criticizing the
decision in Roe v. Wade, Professor Ely observed: "What is frighten-
ing about Roe is that this super-protected right [that of a woman
to choose to have an abortion] is not inferable from the language of
the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific prob-
lem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they
included, or the nation's governmental structure." 146 Others have
attempted to answer this sort of criticism by analyzing Roe as a case
that protected values inferable from the establishment clause of the
first amendment1 47 or as reflective of the implicit limitation on
exercise of the police power to those matters involving the "public
welfare." 148 Either or both of these approaches might be utilized
to ground the substantive rights discussed here in specific constitu-
tional language.
In addition, the Court has frequently felt competent to inter-
pret the general language of the due process clause in such a way as
to protect particular aspects of personal liberty that find no specific
expression in other constitutional language. As Justice Goldberg
observed:
[A] judicial construction that this fundamental right [pri-
vacy in marriage] is not protected by the Constitution be-
cause it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the
first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution
would violate the Ninth Amendment, which specifically
states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." 149
This Article adheres to Justice Goldberg's formulation, but
beyond this there is little similarity between the present proposal
and the constitutional analysis employed by the modern Court. To
146 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
LJ. 920, 935-36 (1973).
147 Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 Hazv. L. REv. 1, 18-25 (1973).
148 Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. RPEv. 689 (1976). See also
Perry, supra note 143, at 452.
149 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965).
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the extent generalizations are possible, the Court, when confronted
with a claim that a particular governmental action violates due
process, first attempts to label the specific right as narrowly as pos-
sible. Once isolated, the right is then classified as fundamental or
not. If a fundamental right is involved, governmental action in-
fringing it must be supported by some compelling governmental
interest.150 A nonfundamental liberty may be infringed by any
governmental action that bears a rational relationship to some ob-
jective within the government's power.151 The entire case will thus
revolve around the process of labeling and classifying the individual
right involved. If a statute must be predicated upon a compelling
interest, it is virtually certain to be invalidated, but if only a rational
relationship between means and ends need be shown, the individual
bringing the challenge will rarely be able to overcome the presump-
tion of constitutionality., 2
In the context of the specific types of criminal statutes discussed
earlier, proscription of marijuana sale and possession, sodomy, and
obscenity, the present Court would probably not find any funda-
mental rights infringed. Presumably no fundamental right exists
to use marijuana or view dirty movies. This type of approach, how-
ever, bypasses the really crucial issue. Courts are not being asked
to decide whether the Constitution implicitly says anything about
smoking marijuana; they are being asked if there is any good reason
for putting someone in jail for smoking marijuana. No principled
evaluation of these cases can avoid reference to the broader social
purpose of a criminal prosecution.15 3
15o Roe v. Wade is a prime example of this type of constitutional analysis.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), an
equal protection case, the majority opinion of Justice Powell and a dissenting opinion
by Justice Marshall, id. 70, provide good examples of the Court's reasoning process
in labeling rights and classifying them as fundamental or not. See Note, On Privacy:
Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberhj, 48 N.Y.U. L. IEv. 670, 701-05 (1973).
151 The cases in which the rational relationship test was used to uphold state
and federal legislation are legion. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton is an example of
such cases. If one ignores early substantive due process cases such as Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and a few equal protection cases which employed
this standard, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), it is difficult to find cases in which a rational relationship was
found lacking.
152 Only two Supreme Court cases have upheld a statute which infringed a
"fundamental right." One of these is Roe v. Wade. Although the statute at issue
was declared unconstitutional, the Court found that protecting the fetus after viability
was a compelling enough reason to justify infringing the woman's right of privacy.
In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the war emergency was found
compelling enough to abridge the rights of those with Japanese ancestry.
153 Society seeks to punish only those whose actions have been shown to violate
some tenet of social conduct that is necessary for the protection of persons and
property. To achieve this aim without punishing the innocent-those who did not
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The test suggested earlier, can best be explained in the context
of a few illustrative situations. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 154
a movie theater showed pornographic films to adults only. If such
a business fully advises its patrons of the nature of its product, so
that the patrons are truly "consenting," in such a way that passersby
or other members of the public do not have a potentially offensive
pornographic display thrust upon them, 155 it is difficult to perceive
where the "substantial risk of direct physical, emotional or financial
harm" might arise. Even the Supreme Court grudgingly seemed to
admit that "there is no conclusive proof of a connection between
antisocial behavior and obscene material." 156 Even though there
might be some evidence supporting a link between pornography
and violent crime or sexual victimization of minors, this evidence
falls far short of establishing a "substantial risk" of such a connec-
tion.157 The criminal prosecution of a theater owner or patron
under these circumstances would offend due process. Obviously
this approach does not elevate such nebulous concepts as the tone
or decency of society into the status of legitimate governmental in-
terests, the specific content of which are certain to vary depending
on the moral values of a given societal majority.
commit such acts, or those whose acts do not warrant punishment-courts employ the
concepts of presumption of innocence and due process of law. A presumption of
innocence exists in all criminal cases which must be overcome by evidence which
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption and burden of proof,
of course, goes only to the issue of whether the elements of the crime the defendant
is charged with violating have been proven. Thus, the legislature might decide, for
example, that individuals who grow their hair longer than a particular length present
a health hazard and should be jailed. Although the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a particular defendant's hair length exceeded the maximum
permitted, the defendant must prove the statute violates due process of law.
A change in the defendant's plea from "I didn't do it," to "I did it but you
are abusing your power by punishing me for it," should not work such an abrupt
change in his legitimate expectations as to the government's burdens and conse-
quently in his rights. Nevertheless, I am not ultimately arguing that the presumption
of constitutionality should be reversed in criminal cases. The principle suggested in
text need not require the state to demonstrate affirmatively the "harm to others"
occasioned by criminal conduct in the absence of a prima facie showing by the
defendant that no such harm results from the conduct in question. See note 15 supra.
154413 U.S. 49 (1973).
155 It would not seem that the prosecution of individuals for a public display
of obscene materials runs afoul of the proposed standard. Even if one were to
ignore the possibility that minors could view such a public display, the offensive
nature of obscenity to many in our society arguably justifies criminal restrictions on
public displays. The proposed constitutional standard and the supporting arguments
need not protect the purveyor or possessor of pornography in the absence of informed
consent by all parties exposed to the material.
156Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973).
157 See F. ScHruz- a, THE LAW OF OBscEzrr 58-64 (1976).
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The evidence concerning the harmfulness of marijuana use
summarized earlier 58 tends to produce a similar conclusion as to
existing marijuana laws. Although Ravin v. State' 59 essentially
produced such a result, the Alaska Supreme Court viewed the drug's
harmlessness as important only insofar as the prosecution involved
an individual using marijuana in the "privacy of his home." If the
relatively benign nature of marijuana makes private consumption
in the home beyond the state's power to prohibit, how then, in the
absence of some governmental scheme for the orderly distribution
of the drug, may the punishment of those who sell to such "private"
consumers be justified? How is this "private" consumer to acquire
the drug he cannot be punished for using? Because Ravin, follow-
ing Griswold, rested on the sanctity of the home, it could only con-
clude that the criminal sanction did not reach so far. The standard
proposed here does not depend on the privacy of the home as a
basis for constitutional protection-one has a right to engage in
conduct that will not harm others regardless of the location of
the act. It is absurd to talk about a right to use a product when it
remains illegal to purchase the product and illegal to transport it to
the place where it may rightfully be consumed. Under our present
state of knowledge, no aspect of the marijuana transaction presents
the kind of risk of harm to others required by the constitutional
standard under discussion.
Ironically, criminal abortion statutes, already declared uncon-
stitutional to the extent that they prohibit abortions before the
stage of viability is reached, present the most difficult question
under the proposed test of all the types of statutes previously men-
tioned. Because a potential life is involved in the abortion decision,
the state can argue that prohibition of abortions is justified by a
desire to prevent "harm to others." The point at which the state's
interest in prohibiting abortions becomes compelling under cur-
rent doctrine, however, the stage at which the fetus becomes
viable, 100 seems to be the only legitimate point at which the state
158 See note 4 supra.
159 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
160 Although in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton the point at which the state's
interest in protecting fetal life became "compelling" was said to be viability, the
opinion suggested that this point was generally reached at the end of the second
trimester of pregnancy. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976),
the Court upheld a statutory definition of viability as "that stage of fetal develop-
ment when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the
womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." Id. 63. Quaere whether
advances in medical science that might ultimately make viability occur at conception
will eliminate the rights recognized in Roe v. Wade or prompt a redrawing of the
lines between the women's right to abort and the fetus' right to live.
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can identify a "harm to others" under the proposed standard. As
Professor Tribe wrote in defense of the result in Roe v. Wade:
Viability thus marks a point after which a secular state
could properly conclude that permitting abortion would
be tantamount to permitting murder, not because of some
illusion that this biologically arbitrary point signals "any
morally significant change in the developing human," and
certainly not because of any (necessarily religious) notion
that the fetus is intrinsically a human being from that
technology-dependent point forward, but rather on the
secular and quite practical ground that a state wishing to
prevent the killing of infants simply has no way to dis-
tinguish the deliberate destruction of the latter from what
is involved in postviability abortions.' 6 '
Considerable additional time might be spent detailing the ap-
plication of the proposed test to a wide variety of existing and
potential uses of the criminal sanction, but that would place undue
emphasis upon the particular form of words chosen in the test,
detracting from the central point set forth in this Article. The
power of government to levy criminal sanctions should not be used
to impose majoritarian moral values on the rest of society unless
those values coincide with the legitimate function of government.
At least in this context, the legitimate function should be limited to
protecting the persons and property of individuals against the
tangibly harmful acts of others. To put an individual in jail for
his own good or because his conduct offends some moral precept
seems itself immoral and arguably unconstitutional as well. As
Herbert L. Packer observed, "[t]he criminal sanction represents a
very special kind of law, itself morally hazardous." 162 When an
individual is jailed merely because the majority does not like the
way he acts, the potential moral hazard posed by the criminal sanc-
tion is no longer inchoate.
161 Tribe, supra note 147, at 27-28 (footnotes omitted).
162 H. PAc KR, supra note 130, at 261.
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